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Regulating Directors" Duties
with Civil Penalties: Taking a
Leaf from Australia's Book
Pey-Woan Lee*
Abstract This article examines whether the use of the criminal penalty
as a 'default' sanction for regulating directors' core duties in Singapore
is excessive, and if so, whether civil pecuniary penalties ought to be
introduced in the reform of the existing sanctions regime. These ques-
tions are addressed principally by reference to the Australian
experience.
I. Introduction
More than a decade ago, the Australian reform committee chaired by
Senator Barney Cooney advocated the move to decriminalize the reg-
ulation of directors' duties, and to confine criminal liability to conduct
which 'is genuinely criminal in nature'.' As a result, the civil penalty
was introduced in Australian corporate regulation to aid in the en-
forcement of directors' statutory duties. More recently, a similar con-
cern has arisen in Singapore, where the Company Legislation and
Regulatory Framework Committee ('CLRFC') recommended 'a total
review of the [Companies Act] with the objective of decriminalizing
those provisions where civil and regulatory sanctions would be suffi-
cient'. 2 Is such concern justified? If so, to what extent is the civil
pecuniary penalty an answer to the problem? This article examines
these questions in the specific context of regulating directors' duties
in Singapore3 and it does so by reference to the Australian experience.
It observes that in Singapore, the availability of the criminal penalty as
Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University, Lee Kong Chian
School of Business; e-mail pwlee@smu.edu.sg I would like to thank Professor Arie
Freiberg of Monash University and Assistant Professor Tham Chee Ho of
Singapore Management University for their comments and encouragement. All
errors are my responsibility.
I Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Company
Directors' Duties: Report on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of
Company Directors, Canberra (1989) para. 13.12 ('the Cooney Report').
2 Report of the Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (2002)
para. 4.6.1 ('the CLRFC Report').
3 The civil pecuniary penalty is not entirely new to Singapore as it has been applied
in the regulation of insider trading since 2000: see Securities and Futures Act
(Cap 289, 2002 Rev Ed), s. 232. For comments on this development, see P. Koh and
P. W. Lee, 'Of Driftnets And Submarines-The Insider Trading Laws of Singapore'
Published in Common Law World Review, 2006, 35 (1), 1-23
https://doi.org/10.1350/clwr.2006.35.1.1
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
a 'default' sanction for a breach of the director's duty to 'act honestly
and use reasonable diligence' under the Companies Act, s. 157(1) is
unsatisfactory. It also suggests that a comprehensive rationalization of
the attendant sanctions is best undertaken with the incorporation of
civil pecuniary penalties. As an effective and proportionate response
to contraventions which fall short of crime, the civil pecuniary penalty
will enhance the responsiveness of the enforcement regime and result
in the attainment of optimal compliance in the long term.
II. Directors' Core Duties
i Common Law
It is necessary and appropriate to set the stage by briefly recapitulat-
ing directors' core common law as well as statutory duties, as the
former continue to form the substratum of the latter in both the Aus-
tralian and the Singaporean companies legislation.4 Broadly speaking,
the common law duties may be divided into two groups. The first and
larger group is characterized by its exaction of undivided loyalty from
the fiduciary-director. This group would include the duty to act in
good faith in the best interests of the company,5 the duty to act for a
proper purpose, as well as the rules against self-dealing and improper
use of property or information acquired in one's capacity as director.
The second group essentially comprises the duty to act with care, skill
and diligence, and is said to be distinguishable from the first in that
the latter is not concerned with promoting loyalty or protecting the
company's particular vulnerability arising from reposing trust and
confidence in a director, but only in ensuring that the director meets
an objectively determined level of care in the discharge of his duties.6
ii Statutory Duties-Singapore
In Singapore, the legislative equivalent of the director's duties at com-
mon law duties is found principally in the Companies Act, s. 157,1
(2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 298. See also Attorney-General's
Chambers, Civil and Administrative Sanctions, Consultation Paper LRRD No.
7/2002, 13 May 2002.
4 In both jurisdictions, the relevant statutory provisions serve only to supplement,
and do not in anyway derogate from the common law obligations: see
Corporations Act 2001 (Australia), s. 185; and Companies Act (Cap 50, 1994 Rev
Ed, Singapore), s. 157(4).
5 Controversy surrounds this proposition; see, for instance, the different views of
L. Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed' in J. Getzler (ed.), Rationalizing Property,
Equity and Trusts (Lexisnexis UK: London, 2003) and M. Conaglen, 'The Nature
and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty' (2005) 121 LQR 452. Fortunately, it is
unnecessary to examine this perplexing issue here.
6 Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 14 ACSR 109; Bristol and
West Building Society v Mothew [19981 Ch 1. This conceptual distinction has,
however, been the subject of criticism, see S. Elliott, 'Fiduciary Liability for Client
Mortgage Frauds' (1999) 13 Trust Law International 74.
7 Ch. 50, 1994 Rev Ed.
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which in turn has its roots in the Companies Act 1961 of Victoria
(Australia).8 The main provisions of s. 157 read as follows:
(1) A director shall at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence
in the discharge of the duties of his office.
(2) An officer or agent of a company shall not make improper use of any
information acquired by virtue of his position as an officer or agent of
the company to gain, directly or indirectly, an advantage for himself or
for any other person or to cause detriment to the company.
It will be observed that, with the exception of the rule against im-
proper use of information, which has been expressed in s. 157(2), the
director's other duties of loyalty are generally regarded as falling
within the ambit of the charge to 'act honestly'. 9 A failure to act with
due care would similarly result in a breach of s. 157(1) as this duty is
encapsulated by the direction to 'use reasonable diligence'."0 A breach
of any of the obligations set out in s. 157 may give rise to both civil
and criminal consequences: the defaulting director may be required to
give an account of his profits, and/or pay damages to the company,
and he may, in addition, be subject to criminal prosecution resulting
in a maximum fine of S$5,000 or imprisonment of up to one year."
iii Statutory Duties-Australia
Like many other provisions of the Singapore companies legislation,
s. 157 is a rather antiquated provision which has undergone virtually
no change from the time of its inception. In contrast, its legislative
counterpart in Australia has undergone more changes. For purposes
of understanding the legislative context in which the civil penalty was
introduced in Australia, a good point to begin would be s. 232 of the
Corporations Law (Cth) as it existed prior to the introduction of the
civil penalty in 1993. Until then, the resemblance between s. 232 and
its Singaporean counterpart was still perceptible, in that under s. 232,
a director was under a charge to act honestly in the discharge of his
duties, 12 exercise reasonable care and diligence,'3 and not to make
improper use of his position 4 or of information acquired by virtue of
his position. 5 A breach of any of these duties could, in addition to the
usual civil remedies at common law, attract penal consequences under
the then Corporations Law. This regulatory framework was, however,
substantially transformed by two subsequent waves of reform. The
first occurred in 1993, when civil penalties were introduced as the
8 See C. H. Tan (ed), Walter Woon on Company Law, 3rd edn (Sweet & Maxwell
Asia: Singapore, 2005) 10.
9 Cheam Tat Pang v PP [1996] 1 SLR 541 at 545.
10 Lim Weng Kee v PP [2002] 4 SLR 327.
11 Companies Act, s. 157(3).
12 Corporations Law, s. 232(2).
13 Ibid., s. 232(4).
14 Ibid., s. 232(6).
15 hid., s. 232(5).
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'default' response to a breach of s. 232,16 thus confining penal conse-
quences to breaches committed with dishonest or fraudulent inten-
tion. 7 The second wave took place in 1999, which resulted in the
repeal of s. 232, and its replacement by ss. 180 to 183 of the Corpora-
tions Act 2001 (Cth). These latter provisions sought to tease out the
distinct fiduciary rules that were hitherto lumped under the general
charge to 'act honestly', 18 and introduced a statutory business judg-
ment rule. 9 Further refinements were also made to the rules govern-
ing the civil penalty regime. 20 As a result, the Australian regulatory
regime is now in many ways distinct from its Singaporean counter-
part, of which the inclusion of the civil penalty is arguably the most
striking.
III Civil Penalty Regime-An Overview
Since its introduction in 1993, the reach of the civil penalty2' has
extended beyond the regulation of directors' duties in Australian cor-
porate regulation. 22 The focus of this article is, however, on the use of
the civil pecuniary penalty in regulating the core duties of the director.
Under the Australian Corporations Act 2001, the following directors'
duties are designated as 'civil penalty provisions':
1. the duty to act with care and diligence; 23
2. the duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the
company;2
4
3. the duty to act for proper purposes; 2
5
4. the duty not to use his position improperly for gain or to cause
detriment to the company;26 and
5. the duty not to use information obtained in his capacity as a
director for gain or to cause detriment to the company.27
16 Thid., s. 1317DA.
17 bid., s. 1317FA.
18 For instance, the duty to act in good faith in the company's best interests, and the
duty to act for proper purposes, now form two distinct limbs of Corporations Act
2001, s. 181.
19 bid., s. 180(2).
20 See below text to n. 45.
21 Under the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, 'civil penalty orders' would
include pecuniary orders (see below n.31 ), compensation orders (see below n. 37)
and disqualification orders (see below n. 32). This article is principally concerned
with the first of these orders.
22 More recently, the sanction has been extended to other areas of corporate
regulation including contraventions of share capital transactions, statutory duties
of managed investment schemes and market misconduct: see generally, H. Ford,
R. Austin and I. Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law [Electronic
Resource] (Butterworths: London), (URL: http://online.butterworthsonline.com)
section 3.400.
23 Corporations Act 2001, s. 180.
24 Thid., s. 181(1)(a).
25 Thid., s. 181(1)(b).
26 Ibid., s. 182.
27 Ibid., s. 183.
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The salient features of the civil penalty regime include the following:
1. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)
is the primary institution vested with the power to invoke civil
penalty proceedings, 28 which commence upon ASIC's applica-
tion to the court for a declaration of contravention of a civil
penalty provision.
29
2. As its name suggests, the proceedings are civil in nature. The
applicable standard of proof and procedural rules are those of
civil proceedings generally.3"
3. Upon the court's declaration of a contravention, ASIC may
apply to the court for a 'pecuniary penalty', which involves the
payment of an amount of up to A$200,000, 1 and/or a 'disquali-
fication order', which proscribes the person affected from man-
aging a company for a period of time determined by the court.
3 2
These sanctions are not, however, granted as a matter of course
upon mere proof of contravention. The pecuniary order will
only be granted if the court is satisfied that the contravention
has either resulted in material prejudice to the company, its
members, or its creditors, or that it is otherwise a serious con-
travention.31 Similarly, the disqualification order will only be
granted where the court is of the view that it is 'justified'3 4 to do
so, having regard to the person's conduct in managing the
corporation's business.35 Where a pecuniary penalty is granted,
the pecuniary penalty constitutes a civil debt payable to ASIC
acting on behalf of the Australian Commonwealth.36
4. A noteworthy aspect of the regime lies in its provisions for the
recovery of loss-the court may, in addition to making a pecu-
niary order, make a compensation order against the liable per-
son in respect of damage sustained by the corporation as a
result of the contravention. 37 In assessing such 'damage', the
court may include the profits made by the offender from the
contravention.
38
28 The standing to apply for this declaration is conferred primarily on ASIC: ibid.,
s. 1317J(1).
29 Ibid., s. 1317E(2).
30 Tbid., s. 1317L; but cf. below text to nn. 107ff.
31 Ibid., s. 1317G(1).
32 Ibid., s. 206C.
33 ibid., s. 1317G(1).
34 ibid., s. 206C(1)(b).
35 Ibid., s. 206C(2)(a).
36 Ibid., s. 1317G(2).
37 ibid., s. 1317HA(1). The order may be made upon the application of either ASIC or
the corporation: see ibid., ss. 1317J(1) and (2).
38 Ibid., s. 1317HA(2). The inclusion of profits in the determination of loss creates, at
first sight, a conceptual oddity. It seems, however, that this oddity is more
apparent than real as the provision was merely intended to preserve the
company's right to seek a profit-stripping remedy (regardless whether any loss is
also sustained) previously existing under the Corporations Law, s. 1317HD: see
Ford, Austin & Ramsay, above n. 22 at section 3.400.
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5. The court is empowered, notwithstanding the contravention of
a civil penalty provision, to relieve a person from liability where
it is shown that he has acted honestly and that, having regard to
all the circumstances, he ought fairly to be excused from the
contravention.39
6. The significance and usefulness of the civil penalty regime de-
rive essentially from its role as a non-criminal regulatory re-
sponse. Not surprisingly, therefore, the boundaries of its
application, as distinguished from that the criminal sanction,
must be unambiguously ascertained. For this purpose, the no-
tion of fault serves as the critical distinguishing element. Thus,
although the contravention of a civil penalty provision does not
by itself constitute an offence, criminal liability could arise
where additional fault elements are established. For instance, a
director who contravenes a civil penalty provision by failing to
act in good faith in the best interests of the company, or by
acting for improper purposes, will incur criminal liability if he
has also acted recklessly or is intentionally dishonest.4" Sim-
ilarly, improper use of position or information gives rise to
criminal liability upon proof of dishonesty coupled with inten-
tion or recklessness as regards its consequences.
4 1
7. The inter-relation of civil and criminal proceedings is arguably
the most problematic dimension of the regime.4" The funda-
mental concern is that of double jeopardy-that no person
should be punished twice over for the same offence. This trans-
lates into two principal prohibitions-first, that a person who
has been convicted of a criminal offence cannot be subject to
civil penalty charges for substantially the same conduct;43 and
secondly, that civil penalty proceedings must be stayed when
criminal proceedings are or have been started in respect of
substantially the same conduct.' However, the grant of a civil
penalty order does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution in
respect of the same conduct.4 5 This latter concession was made
in response to the concern that a bar against subsequent crimi-
nal proceedings constituted a 'significant disincentive' for using
the civil penalty as an enforcement tool.4 As an additional
check against any risk of undermining the rigour of the con-
stitutional safeguard, however, evidence adduced in the civil
39 Corporations Act 2001, s. 1317S.
40 Ibid., s. 184(1).
41 Ibid., ss. 184(2) and (3).
42 See below text to nn. 107ff.
43 Ibid., s. 1317M.
44 Ibid., s. 1317N(1).
45 Ibid., s. 1317P.
46 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum,
para. 6.7.
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proceedings is not admissible in the subsequent criminal
proceedings.4 7
IV. Overreach of the Criminal Law
i. The Problem in Australia
In evaluating the sanctions for directors' legislative duties, the Cooney
Committee concluded that:
The criminal law is a necessary means of enforcing proper behaviour.
When offences are genuinely criminal in nature, criminal sanctions are
appropriate. They are only appropriate in those circumstances.'
In its view, an offence is 'genuinely criminal' where company directors
had acted 'fraudulently or dishonestly but not otherwise'. 49 It was
apprehended that imposing criminal liability in the absence of crimi-
nality might deter able candidates from taking on directorships, 50 and
would ultimately give rise to a situation of inadequate enforcement,
where courts would be disinclined to impose jail terms which they
considered too draconian, while the modest fines imposed in their
stead were perceived to be disproportionate to the gravity of the
misconduct. 1
The root cause of unhappiness felt by critics of 'over-
criminalization' lies in the belief that the criminal law, as the most
severe and intrusive form of social control, ought to be distinguished
from other lesser forms of social control by its moral content.5 2 Three
distinct (though overlapping) aspects of such moral content may be
discerned in the relevant literature, namely, culpable intention, social
harmfulness and moral wrongfulness. 53 The Cooney Committee's
complaint of excessive criminality relates to the insufficient fault ele-
ments of the Corporations Law, s. 232-the statutory duty then in
force. Particularly poignant illustrations of this grievance arose in
connection with the attempts to ascertain the fault element comprised
47 Corporations Act 2001, s. 1317Q.
48 The Cooney Report, para. 13.12.
49 Tbid., para. 13.5.
50 Ibid., paras. 13.4 and 13.7.
51 Ibid., para. 13.6.
52 See e.g. F. B. Sayer, 'Public Welfare Offenses' (1933) 33 Columbia Law Review 55;
and more recently, A. Ashworth, 'Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?' (2000) 116
LQR 225; and M. Bagaric, 'he "Civilisation" of the Criminal Law' (2001) 25
Criminal Law Journal 184. In England, the 'trend' of over-criminalization does not
appear to be abating: see R. Baldwin, 'The New Punitive Regulation' (2004) 67
MLR 351. For a recent discussion of the problem in the context of English
company law reform, see P. W. Lee, 'Reassessing The Crime Of Non-disclosure
Under Section 317 Of The Companies Act 1985' (2005) 5 Journal of Corporate Law
Studies 139.
53 For a useful discussion, see S. P. Green, "Why It's a Crime to tear the Tag off a
Mattress: Overcriminalisation and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offences'
(1997) 46 Emory L J 1533, 1547-63.
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in s. 232(2)-which required directors to 'act honestly' in the dis-
charge of their duties. It was said in Marchesi v Barnes & Keogh5 4 that
the mens rea of this criminal offence was 'a consciousness that what is
being done is not in the interests of the company, and deliberate
conduct in disregard of that knowledge'.55 So construed, the require-
ment for honesty placed a distinct emphasis on the requirement for
subjective intention,56 and as such the attachment of the criminal sanc-
tion appeared unobjectionable. In Australian Growth Resources Cor-
poration Pty Ltd v Van Reseema,57 however, an objective approach was
in fact adopted, such that a director who acted for improper purposes
in acquiring the assets of a company on terms unfavourable to the
company and its creditors was found, notwithstanding his honest
belief in the propriety of his action, to be in breach of s. 232(2). Indeed,
in explicating the concept of 'dishonesty' which transgresses s. 232,
King CJ likened it to the notion of 'constructive fraud, a species of
dishonesty that does not involve moral turpitude'. 8 That such a direc-
tor could (in theory, at least) be vulnerable to criminal sanctions was,
in the view of the Cooney Committee, clearly unacceptable.5
9
Yet another area of excessive criminality was perceived in the crim-
inalization of a failure to act with due care in breach of s. 232(4) since
the essence of negligence is concerned, once again, with an objec-
tively determined standard of conduct. Although s. 232(4) was con-
verted to a civil penalty provision in 1993 such that a breach of that
section would only attract criminal penalties upon proof of additional
mental elements such as knowledge, intention, recklessness and dis-
honesty or deception, the Australian regulators still found such a
resolution to be fundamentally unsatisfactory because the very notion
of negligence seemed inherently incongruent with the criminal states
of mind identified.6'
The difficulties experienced in attempting to ascribe a consistent
meaning to the term 'honestly' may be better understood if the lan-
guage adopted in s. 232(2) is traced back to its common law source-
the prescription that a director must act bona fide for the benefit of
the company.61 In a sense, the substitution of 'bona fide' with 'hon-
estly' is bound to yield unsatisfactory results because at common law,
the reference to bona fide or good faith bears a wider and hence,
54 [1970] VR 434.
55 Ibid. at 438 (emphasis added). See, generally, Ford, Austin & Ramsay, above n. 22
at section 8.065.
56 This is in line with common law authorities such as Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942]
Ch 304.
57 (1988) 13 ACLR 261.
58 Ibid. at 272.
59 The Cooney Report, para. 4.70.
60 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998, Explanatory Memorandum,
para. 6.1.
61 Marchesi v Barnes [1970] VR 434 at 437, citing Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407 at 428-9 and Lindley MR in Lagunas Nitrate Co v
Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 932 at 935.
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different purport-it is principally concerned with whether there has
been a 'genuine 62 exercise of discretion on the part of the director. To
establish good faith, the director's subjective honesty constitutes an
important, but not exhaustive, test. As such, the reach of the duty
extends beyond subjectively honest conduct.6 3 Further, the common
law duty of good faith, as well as s. 232(2), has been construed as
convenient shorthand for a range of fiduciary and equitable rules to
which the director is subject at common law.64 Although these rules
are unified by the common goal of promoting loyalty and guarding
against the abuse of powers, yet each is clearly distinct in its applica-
tion. To the extent that any or some of these rules prescribe objective
standards of conduct, the director's subjective state of mind is irrele-
vant. Australian Growth Resources Corporation Pty Ltd v Van
Reseema65 usefully illustrates this difficulty, as the duty to act for
proper purposes may be breached in spite of the offending director's
honest intent. Subsuming such a duty under the larger duty of acting
honestly necessarily leads to the contortion of 'honesty'. The same
difficulty would also arise to the extent that the statutory duty en-
compassed the no-conflict and no-profit rules, which are character-
ized essentially by the strict objective standards they embody.66
The foregoing account is entirely historical as the revised Austra-
lian legislation has addressed these problems in a number of ways.
First, s. 232 has been repealed and replaced by ss. 180 to 183 of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). No longer is the director subject to a
general charge to act 'honestly', but section 181(1)(a) provides that he
must exercise his powers and discharge his duties 'in good faith in the
best interests of the corporation'. The reversion to the notion of 'good
62 L. Sealy, "'Bona Fides" and "Proper Purposes" in Corporate Decisions' (1989) 15
Mon U Law Rev 265 at 269.
63 For instance, if a director fails to consider the interests of a company separately,
usually as a result of an unreflective assumption that the company's interests are
aligned with those of its shareholders, he will be in breach of his duty of good
faith at common law even if he could not be said to have been subjectively
dishonest, see e.g. Re W & M Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 432. Cf Charterbridge Corporation
Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1970] Ch 62, where it was observed that a director does
not ipso facto breach his fiduciary obligation when he looks to the benefit of the
group of companies (to which the company belonged) as a whole without giving
separate consideration to the benefit of the company, as long as it could be
established, objectively, that the transaction is beneficial to the company.
64 This approach assumes that all the other fiduciary and equitable rules are in fact
subject to and derived from the single overriding rule that a director must act in
good faith in the interests of the company, see J. Dine, Company Law, 3rd edn
(Macmillan Press Limited, 2001) 189. The approach adopted in recent reform
efforts in both Australia and the United Kingdom has, however, tended towards
treating each rule as distinct from the others: see Corporations Act 2001, ss. 180-3
and the UK Government's White Paper on Company Law Reform (March 2005),
ch. 7 (Draft Clauses), part B.
65 Above n. 57.
66 See e.g. Guinness v Saunders [19901 2 AC 663 and Regal Hastings v Gulliver [1967]
AC 134.
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faith' better accords with the common law duty, and avoids the inter-
pretative uncertainties that plagued the term 'honestly'. Section
181(1)0,) also separated the duty to act for proper purposes as distinct
from the duty to act in good faith, further reducing any confusion aris-
ing from the conflation of these two duties. Civil penalties now serve as
the 'default' response to a breach of the statutory duties contained in ss.
180 to 183,67 comprising the duty to act with reasonable care and dili-
gence,' in good faith in the company's best interests and for proper
purposes, 69 and not to make improper use of his position70 or of in-
formation71 acquired by virtue of his position. The criminal penalty
attached to a failure to exercise due care has been entirely removed and
breaches of the other duties would only attract penal consequences if
the additional elements of recklessness or dishonesty are established. 2
ii The Problem in Singapore
To a significant extent, a similar instability in the judicial interpreta-
tions of the term 'honestly' can be observed in Singapore. In the
leading case of Cheam Tat Pang v PP,73 Yong Pung How CJ identified
the mens rea of the s. 157(1) offence as the 'knowledge that what is
done is not in the interests of the company', citing Marchesi v Barnes
& Keogh as authority. His Honour went on, however, to observe that
such a test was objective in nature, 74 such that the requisite knowl-
edge or dishonesty may be inferred from the merits of a particular
decision, if that decision involved the taking of risks which no director
could honestly believe to be in the interests of the company.75 In the
more recent decision of Lim Weng Kee v pP 76 however, the same court
considered the test laid down in Cheam Tat Pang to be subjective in
nature. Semantics aside, it is arguable that the Cheam Tat Pang test
does in substance require the finding of a subjectively culpable state
of mind but admits, as a matter of evidence, inferences of such culpa-
bility to be drawn from circumstantial evidence such as palpably un-
meritorious decisions. Even so, the reference to 'honestly' in s. 157(1)
remains problematic for another reason-that it does in fact encap-
sulate duties the observance of which is clearly independent of the
director's subjective state of mind. In Kea Holdings Pte Ltd v Gan
67 Corporations Law, s. 1317DA.
68 Corporations Act 2001, s. 180.
69 Ibid., s. 181.
70 Ibid., s. 182.
71 Ibid., s. 183.
72 Ibid., s. 184.
73 [1996] 1 SLR 541 at 545.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid at 561-2.
76 [20021 4 SLR 327 at 335.
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Boon Hock,77 for example, the respondent was the managing director
of the appellant company (a shipbuilder) and subsequently became a
shareholder and director of another company known as Sinindo Pa-
cific Pte Ltd. The appellant had contracted to purchase three barges
with a view to sell the same on to purchasers, but subsequently can-
celled the order on the respondent's advice that no buyer could be
found for the barges, incurring losses in the form of forfeited deposits
as a result. Unknown to the appellant, however, Sinindo was in fact
looking for barges at around the same time as the cancellation of the
appellant's orders and eventually contracted to purchase the barges
from another shipbuilder. The respondent was found to be in breach
of s. 157(1), as he had failed to inform the appellant of a possible
willing buyer, namely Sinindo, for the barges. This was so even
though he was clearly under no duty to direct any business from
Sinindo to the appellant, since any such duty would have been incon-
sistent with his duty to act in the best interests of Sinindo. Evidently,
the result of this case did not turn on the respondent's subjective
motivation, it was not a question of whether he knew that his omis-
sion to inform the appellant was not in the latter's best interests (and
the question might not even have occurred to him having regard to
the fact that he had no duty to direct any business from Sinindo to the
appellant) but simply whether he ought to have disclosed. It is true, no
doubt, that the decision in Kea Holdings was concerned only with
imposing civil liability, but that is immaterial for present purposes as
s. 157(1) does not in fact distinguish between the elements of civil and
criminal breaches.
The difficulties relating to the mental component of s. 157(1) are
even more pronounced where the offence arises from a breach of the
second limb-to 'use reasonable diligence' in the discharge of the
directors' duties. In Lim Weng Kee v PP 8 Yong Pung How CJ rejected
the suggestion that criminal liability for failure to use reasonable dili-
gence pursuant to s. 157(1) could only be imposed if the accused was
subjectively 'conscious of the risks involved but goes on to take the
risks'. 79 In his Honour's view, the statutory prescription for reasonable
diligence clearly envisaged a standard of conduct that was objectively
determined, and this same standard of conduct applied for purposes
of determining both civil and criminal breaches. Importantly, the
court observed that such a conclusion was not only defensible on the
basis of a textual analysis of the provision, but also as a matter of
public policy, which the learned judge explained in the following
terms:8 0
77 [2000] 3 SLR 129.
78 [2002] 4 SLR 327.
79 Ihid. at 335.
80 ]bid. at 336 (emphasis added).
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While the objective of civil liability is to compensate the company for
losses caused by directors' negligence, the aim of criminal liability is to
protect the wider public interests by deterring directors from acting neg-
ligently. It should be clear by now that corporate scandals, especially in
large listed companies, impact adversely not only on the company in
question, but may also have a ripple effect on the wider stock market
and the economy. Civil liability is however not intended to protect, and
in many cases is ineffective in protecting, the wider public interests,
simply because a civil action is not brought in many cases. For instance,
the director may be bankrupt by then and will not have the resources to
pay any damages. Sometimes, members of the company may not want
to tarnish the reputation of the company due to the negative publicity
generated by suing the errant director. There are many other reasons
why a civil action may never see the light of day. However, in such cases,
public interests, represented by the criminal law, demand that the errant
director cannot go scot-free. Hence, any test of criminal liability must be
sufficiently robust if it is to protect the public interests by deterring direc-
tors from acting negligently.
That the criminal law plays a pivotal role in safeguarding public
interests is incontrovertible. The question which we ought to rethink,
however, is whether it is the only tool. Where the traditional offering
of civil remedies and criminal penalties are the only two means of
regulating conduct, it is only natural that reliance will be placed on the
latter whenever the former is perceived to be deficient. The Australian
model, however, has demonstrated that a middle course could be
taken. Take, for instance, the facts of Lim Weng Kee v PP. The defen-
dant, the managing director of a number of pawn shops in which he
held beneficial interests, imprudently allowed a fraudster to redeem
some jewellery prior to the clearance of the cheque payment, causing
inordinate loss to the business. He was convicted of and fined for
three charges of failing to use reasonable diligence under s. 157(1).
The dereliction on his part is admittedly unmistakable, but was it
necessary or proportionate to label such a director,8 ' who had already
lost his employment and a lifetime's efforts in the settlement of civil
suits, as a criminal? If the civil penalty had availed as an alternative
sanction, would such a sanction have sufficiently deterred directors
from acting negligently without the stigmatizing effects of the crimi-
nal tool?
The director's exposure to criminal liability under s. 157(1) is prob-
lematic from another perspective-that there is in general no require-
ment for any proof that a breach has resulted in any loss to others. It
is well established, for instance, that a transgression of the stringent
fiduciary rules against conflicts and profiting from the director's office
may occur even where the offending transactions are favourable to
81 ibid. at 338.
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the company.8 2 Analogizing with traditional property offences such as
theft, deception and misappropriation, the case for criminalization is
strongest where the intentional breach of duty results in tangible and
measurable loss. The proposition is uncontroversial as it reflects the
near-absolute protection which the law accords to property rights.
The corollary, however, is that the use of the criminal sanction be-
comes more questionable as the penalized conduct is increasingly
divorced from tangible harm. Admittedly, confining 'harm' to that of
property or tangible loss ignores the wider public interests which the
rules of corporate governance are designed to protect. As Yong CJ
had observed in the Lim Weng Kee case,' corporate failures (usually
the result of management abuses) do often cause a 'ripple effect on the
wider stock market and the economy'. Even so, it is not apparent that
the criminal sanction has to be invoked at the slightest apprehension
of threat to public interests, for there is much to be said for confining
its use to instances involving serious harms, and only as a last resort.a4
In this connection, it is useful to note that a number of relevant Aus-
tralian provisions appeared to have incorporated this dimension of
criminality, as the requisite fault element is only satisfied where it
relates to either causing detriment to the company, or gaining an
advantage for the offending director or someone else.8-
The above survey demonstrates that the over-extension of the crim-
inal law in the context of regulating directors' duties is as much a
reality in Singapore as it was in Australia prior to its reception of the
civil pecuniary penalty. The Australian legislature has chosen to deal
with the problem by simultaneously shrinking the criminal regime
and expanding the civil regime. Such a solution is justifiable, if one
accepts that a diminution in the reach of the criminal sanction would
necessarily result in a regulatory hiatus.8 6 In Australia, this belief is
significantly strengthened by the theory of strategic enforcement
considered in the next section.
82 See Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51-2; Aberdeen Railway Co v Blailde Bros (1854) 1
Macq H L 461, 471; Regal Hastings v Gulliver (1967] AC 134. Although in practice,
much of the rigour which attends the rule against directors' interests in company
transactions is attenuated by express provisions in the company's articles
allowing the same subject only to relevant disclosure being made.
83 See above n. 80. See also E. J. Weinrib, 'rhe Fiduciary Obligation' (1975) 25
University of Toronto Law Journal 1.
84 See e.g. A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 4th edn (Clarendon Press:
Oxford, 2003) 1-2; and D. Husak, 'The Criminal Law as Last Resort' (2004) 24
OJLS 207.
85 See e.g. Corporations Act 2001, ss. 184(2), (3).
86 Whether this is so may ultimately be a complex question of regulatory policy.
Contrast the position in England, where the law reformers categorically declined
to extend the use of criminal sanctions to regulate directors' duties, preferring
instead to treat it as 'a domestic matter for enforcement by the company and its
organs': see Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy-Completing the
Structure, DTI (November 2000) para. 13.36.
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V. Responsive Regulation
The theory of strategic regulation, as propounded by Ayres and
Braithwaite,"7 begins with the proposition that businesses are not
unitary actors concerned solely with profit maximization, but are in
fact 'bundles of contradictory commitments to values of economic
rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility', a As such,
regulatory compliance is optimized when regulation is backed by a
range of sanctions which are sensitive to these diverse motivations.
Generally, enforcement should always begin with the least intrusive
measures designed to persuade the regulatee to comply voluntarily
because that is the cheapest means of enforcement. However, persua-
sion is not effective unless it is backed by the threat of punishment.
Thus, if persuasion fails, the regulator must have the ability to adopt a
tit-for-tat stance by retaliating with a more deterrent or punitive re-
sponse. The more persistent the non-compliance, the more severe will
the regulator's response be. Such a strategy is also 'contingently fero-
cious and forgiving', 9 in that inasmuch as it advocates the use of esca-
lating sanctions to counter non-compliance, it also requires the
regulator to forgive and to presume that the regulatee is socially re-
sponsible as soon as the latter demonstrates the willingness to comply.
Graphically, this enforcement strategy translates into a pyramidal
model comprising the least intrusive responses at its base and sanc-
tions of ascending deterrent or punitive effects towards the apex. This
graphical representation usefully illustrates one of Ayres and
Braithwaite's core contentions-that the very existence of the gra-
dients and peak of the pyramid, representing the most coercive and
draconian sanctions, 'channels most of the regulatory action to the
base of the pyramid-in the realms of persuasion and self-
regulation. "90 Further, this ability to push regulation down to the base
is enhanced as the height of the apex increases. In other words, the
perception that the regulator is able and willing to invoke tough meas-
ures paradoxically leads to increased voluntary compliance, and the
measure of compliance increases in tandem with the punitiveness of
the measures available. Applying the enforcement pyramid to the
present context, the Australian civil penalty provisions would (to-
gether with the criminal liability provisions), in so far as they mandate
incapacitation (disqualification orders), be represented by the apex of
the pyramid; whilst the civil pecuniary penalties would rank after
incapacitation and criminal penalties but above the civil remedial rem-
edies available at common law. The incorporation of civil penalties
within a scheme of sanctions is justified by this strategic theory to the
87 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation
Debate (Oxford University Press: New York, 1992).
88 Ibid. at 29.
89 bid. at 27.
90 Ibid. at 39.
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extent that it enhances the responsiveness of the entire scheme of
sanctions to the mixed motivations of the regulatees, adding to the
'big sticks' which enable the regulator to procure optimal compliance
by 'speaking softly'.
Evidently, the usefulness of this particular regulatory model is de-
pendent on the correctness of the assumptions on which it is based.
Without verifying these assumptions, it is easy to overstate the mod-
el's effectiveness. For instance, the tit for tat strategy envisages re-
peated interactions between the regulator and regulatee, through
which experience the regulator is able to identify the regulatee's moti-
vation and decide on the appropriate course of 'retaliation'. This strat-
egy therefore does not work where the encounter is of a 'one-off'
nature. 91 In the context of corporate regulation, it may appear broadly
correct that the company is involved in repeated interactions with the
regulator in respect of a great number of statutory compliance mat-
ters. However, the same may not be true in the more specific sphere of
directors' core duties. As these duties are primarily concerned with
the impartial and unfettered exercise of discretions with a view to risk-
taking, they are not amenable to regulation by reference to clearly-
defined objectives. Instead, the regulation in this regard is carried out
in a more indirect fashion through mandatory disclosures of relevant
information (in relation, for example, to the company's financial
health, and director's interests in contracts and shares). Detection of
non-compliance is largely delegated to other agents such as corporate
insiders and auditors, and the misconduct typically surfaces only after
the companies concerned are, or are about to be, insolvent. 92 The
pattern of regulation is therefore more likely to be random and hap-
hazard. In such circumstances, not only is the regulator unlikely to
acquire adequate knowledge of the regulatee's motivations, it is also
more likely to respond with deterrent sanctions in the absence of
certainty that future breaches will readily be detected.93
A further difficulty with Ayres and Braithwaite's model lies in its
insistence that regulatory response should always begin from the
base of the pyramid, that is, persuasion always precedes punishment.
As one commentator has pointed out, such a prescription is 'un-
necessarily restrictive':9
If the breach is severe, be it in its moral culpability and/or consequences,
the tit for tat strategy suggests that the response should be equally
severe. Less severe sanctions will not be appropriate, and so there
seems little point in escalating up through them.
91 This exception is expressly admitted by Ayres and Braithwaite: see ibid. at 30.
92 H. Bird, D. Chow, J. Lenne and I. Ramsay, 'ASIC Enforcement Patterns',
University of Melbourne Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 71 at
77 and 106.
93 A similar though more general point has been made, see J. Black, 'Managing
Discretion' 19 (paper presented at ALRC Conference, Penalties: Policy, Principles
and Practice in Government Regulation, Sydney, 8 June 2001).
94 Ibid. at 19.
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In the present writer's view, the point just made relates, in truth, to the
principle of proportionality, namely that the severity of the sanction
must be commensurate with the seriousness of the contravention. At
first blush, this requirement appears to have been incorporated in the
'minimal sufficiency principle' 9 -that the least aggression be utilized
to secure the regulatee's compliance. But that is not the case. The
minimal sufficiency principle, as Ayres and Braithwaite explained, is
founded on psychological studies which reveal that 'the less salient
and powerful the control technique used to secure compliance, the
more likely that internalization will occur'.9" The chief concern lies
therefore in securing prospective compliance, and not in any deonto-
logical notion of fairness or proportionality. Where punitive re-
sponses are introduced, these are justified on the ground that they are
necessary for securing compliance from those who are intransigent,
and not on the premise of wrongdoing per se. 7 Yet it is clear that
regulation is not concerned solely with optimizing compliance, but
doing so on a fair basis. The notion of 'optimal enforcement' ought
itself to comprise a moral dimension, namely that compliance is only
optimal if it results from a process that incorporates the principle of
proportionality. In the corporate regulatory context, the centrality of
the principle appears unquestionable, as it is the very concern with
the disproportionate use of criminal sanctions that prompted the caln
for reform in the first place.98 Indeed, the ideal that a fair and effective
enforcement regime must ultimately be underwritten by notions of
equity and desert has been consistently affirmed by studies of en-
forcement practices, which demonstrate that regulators tend to shy
away from imposing punitive or criminal sanctions save where they
are satisfied that the requisite element of moral blameworthiness can
be established.99
A final observation of Ayres and Braithwaite's model relates to
their assumption that persuasion (vis-A-vis punishment) is always the
cheaper and hence the preferred mode of enforcement. 100 Again, the
95 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n. 87 at 49-51.
96 Ibid. at 49.
97 Such a consequentialist view of the role of criminal justice is evident in
Braithwaite's works, see e.g. J. Braithwaite and P. Petit, Not Just Deserts: A
Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1990); J.
Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford University
Press, 2002); and B. Fisse and J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and
Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
98 See M. Gething, 'Do We Really Need Criminal and Civil Penalties for
Contraventions of Directors' Duties?' [1996] A Bus L Rev 375, 377-9.
99 K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of
Pollution (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1984) 207. In the context of corporate
regulations in Australia, see G. Gilligan, H. Bird and I. Ramsay, 'How Effective are
the Civil Penalty Sanctions in the Australian Corporations Law?' (1999) Centre for
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne, 25; Bird et al,
above n. 92 at 104 and 107.
100 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n. 87 at 19.
REGULATING DIRECTORS' DUTIES WITH CIVIL PENALTIES
correctness of this assumption is clearly context-dependent. °1 It is
uncertain whether such an assumption would hold true in the context
of general corporate regulation, where the regulator could be tasked
to oversee tens of thousands of companies. If non-compliance is wide-
spread, the cost of close supervision and persistent cajoling is unlikely
to be modest. Indeed, it is notable that the UK regulators have in fact
taken the contrary view that a regulatory framework characterized by
significant reliance on criminal sanctions would be the most cost-
effective.102
To sum up, Ayres and Braithwaite's model is useful in highlighting
the diverse motivations of regulatees, calling for a correspondingly
diverse range of sanctions in response. In this connection, the inclu-
sion of the civil penalty may be justified as it enhances the sensitivity
of an enforcement regime by addressing conduct that falls short of
crime.10 3 For reasons pointed out above, the theory's broader claim
that the hierarchical ordering of regulatory responses would channel
substantial regulatory actions to the base of the pyramid is more
questionable. Indeed, in the Australian context, there is some limited
evidence that ASIC's enforcement actions are still characterized by a
sanctioning style, with a greater focus on responses of a penal na-
ture."° Finally, the strategic theory of enforcement must not be under-
stood to displace the principle of proportionality. In practical terms,
this does not only mean confining criminal sanctions to truly criminal
conduct, but also resisting the temptation to deal clemently with the
same as civil offences in the interests only of expediency.
105
VI. A Noxious Hybrid? 0 6
The proposition that the civil penalty supplies a fitting solution to the
problem of over-criminalization presupposes that it is civil in nature
and hence qualitatively distinct from the criminal sanction, but is it?
Professor Kenneth Mann has argued that it is not.10 In his view, the
101 Black, above n. 93 at 19.
102 Completing the Structure, above n. 86 at para. 13.48.
103 See Gilligan, Bird and Ramsay, above n. 99 at 8; and Australian Law Reform
Commission, Principled Regulation: Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australian
Federal Regulation (ALRC 95, 2002) para 2.61.
104 Bird et al., above n. 92 at 103-5. The civil penalty is classified as a form of 'penal
enforcement action' in this study: see ibid. at 51.
105 See N. Andrews, 'If the dog catches the mice: The civil settlement of criminal
conduct under the Corporations Act and the Australian securities and
Investments Act' (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1, where the
commentator contended (at 31) that '[the] development of civil remedies which
overlap with criminal offences has increased the distortion of the use of the
criminal law. That makes these developments vulnerable to a reaction that there is
one form of criminal justice for the rich and another for the poor.'
106 T. Greenwood, 'Corporate Officers-Bounden Duty and Service ... and
Reasonable Lively Sacrifice' (1992) 6 Butterworths Corporate Law Bulletin 61 at 65.
107 K. Mann, 'Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between the Criminal and
Civil Law' (1992) 101 Yale LJ 1795. See also A. Frieberg and P. O'Malley, 'State
Intervention and the Civil Offense' (1984) 18 Law and Society Review, 373.
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civil monetary penalty is a type of hybrid sanction that comprises both
civil and criminal properties, in that while it employs a civil process of
adjudication, its effect is essentially punitive in nature because the
penalty often bears no relation to any loss resulting from the infringe-
ment. Importantly, the recognition of this 'middleground' sanction
calls for the development of heightened or "middleground' procedure
to guard against the subversion of fundamental constitutional values
that are traditionally protected by the more exacting strictures of the
criminal process. Indeed, this allegation that the expansion of civil
sanctions is predominantly motivated by the desire to equip the State
with more convenient (and hence more effective) means of social
control,10 8 often at the expense of eroding the fundamental rights of
the individual, is by far the most serious challenge to the legitimacy of
the civil sanction.
In Australia, the tension just described has surfaced in a number of
cases notwithstanding the express stipulation under the Corporations
Act, s. 1317L that civil evidence and procedure rules are to apply to
civil penalty proceedings. 10 9 Until recently, the tension has been re-
solved by looking to the purpose of the penalty. Thus, notwithstanding
its punitive character, the dominant purpose of the civil pecuniary
penalty is not to punish, but to deter the offender as well as the
general public from future contraventions. 110 The focus on the deter-
rent purpose of the sanction tends to accentuate the protective (hence
civil) function of the sanction over its retributive (criminal) aspects,'
and this reasoning has been applied in a couple of cases to resist the
importation of criminal procedures into civil penalty proceedings." 2
108 See e.g. Freiberg and O'Malley, above n. 107, who argue (at 376) that the civil
offence is the 'central facet' of the State's 'willingness to manipulate the
differences between civil and criminal procedures for various ends'. See also
Principled Regulation, above n. 103 at para. 2.62.
109 For a helpful discussion, see T. Middleton, 'The difficulties of applying civil
evidence and procedure rules in ASIC's civil penalty proceedings under the
Corporations Act' (2003) Company and Securities Law Journal 507.
110 See ASIC v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80 at [125]-[1261.
111 See J. Coffee, 'Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Can Be Done About It' (1992) 101 Yale L J 1875, where the
author argued that the distinction between civil and criminal penalties is that the
former 'prices' while the latter 'prohibits'. The purpose of imposing a civil penalty
is to compel an actor to internalize the social costs of his activity, thereby
deterring him from engaging in it at a level where the cost thereof is likely to
exceed the resultant benefit.
112 In Elliot v ASIC [20041 VSCA 54; (2004) 205 ALR 594, the Court of Appeal
(Victoria) held that the civil penalty proceedings under the Corporations Law
were essentially civil in nature, and declined to apply a stricter requirement for
'fair trial' that was applicable to criminal and quasi-criminal cases. Similarly, in
ASIC v Plymin [2003] VSC 123; (2003) 46 ACSR 126, where Mandie J took the view
that the criminal standard of proof did not apply in civil penalty proceedings,
although his Honour did endorse the 'stricter' approach in Bringinshaw v
Bringinshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, which requires that regard be had to the gravity
of the allegation in determining whether the civil standard of proof has been
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The Australian High Court's recent decision in Rich v ASIC 1 3 has,
however, cast doubt on the validity of the deterrent approach. This
case concerned the imposition of banning orders on two company
directors on account of their failure to act with due care and diligence.
The defendants resisted discovery of documents on the ground that
they were entitled to the privilege against exposure to penalties, and
thus the central question which the court had to answer was whether
a disqualification order was in the nature of a 'penalty'. A majority of
the High Court judges found that it was. The plaintiff's case hinged on
the argument that the design of the disqualification order was not to
punish, but to protect the public by preventing individuals from man-
aging corporations in a manner contrary to proper commercial stan-
dards, and thus the proceedings in question should not attract the
application of the penalty privilege. The majority judges, however,
dismissed as untenable this attempt to distinguish between 'protec-
tive' and 'punitive' purposes: 114
... the supposed distinction between 'punitive' and 'protective' pro-
ceedings or orders suffers the same difficulties as attempting to classify
all proceedings as either civil or criminal. At best, the distinction be-
tween 'punitive' and 'protective' is elusive.
In their Honours' view, the application of the penalty privilege was
not dependent on the simplistic characterization of a proceeding as
punitive or protective.115 Such an approach would be unworkable
given the unstable nature of the distinction, and it wrongly assumed
that the two purposes were mutually exclusive." 6 That a disqualifica-
tion order was punitive in its effects attracted the application of the
penalty privilege.
On a narrow construction, the High Court's decision in Rich v ASIC
has no relevance for the present as it was neither concerned with a
civil pecuniary order, nor with the importation of any criminal rule or
procedure." 7 However, the majority's rejection of the punitive-
protective distinction is of especial pertinence to the present because
the notions of protection and deterrence are inextricably linked-so
often it is the need to protect a particular aspect of public interest that
justifies the deterrence of a certain activity or manner of conduct.
Thus it is not unreasonable to surmise, having regard to its reproach
satisfied. Cf. however, ASIC v Plymin [2002] VSC 56; [2002] 4 VR 168, where
Mandie J appeared to have affirmed the penal quality of the civil penalties by
holding that the Corporations Act, s. 1317L did not preclude the application of the
penalty privilege in civil penalty proceedings.
113 [2004] HCA 42; (2004) 209 ALR 271.
114 Ibid. at [32].
115 Ibid. at [31] and [35].
116 Ibid. at [35].
117 It was not disputed that the privilege against exposure to penalties operates in the
civil context, see ibid. at [24]. The parties also appeared to have conceded that if
the proceedings had involved the imposition of civil pecuniary orders, the penalty
privilege would have applied, see ibid. at [21].
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of the punitive-protective distinction, that the High Court is unlikely to
look favourably upon any attempt to characterize the civil pecuniary
penalty as 'civil' on the basis only that the purpose of the sanction is
that of deterrence and not punishment. If the task of characterization
is determined by looking solely to the effects of the penalty, as the
majority appeared to have done in Rich v ASIC, then the 'civil' status
of the pecuniary penalty is undoubtedly under threat.
No more than a cursory reflection is needed to expose the serious
conundrum that would arise if the civil pecuniary penalty is stripped
of its civil character. As we have seen earlier," 8 the civil penalty owes
its very inception (in the corporate context) to its 'civil' trait-it was
designed to address the problem of excessive criminalization, to re-
spond to conduct which falls short of crime. Hence to insist that its
imposition be attended by criminal-type procedural rules would run
counter to its very raison d'6tre."9 In light of this, there is much to be
said for the contrasting approach adopted by Kirby J in his dissent in
Rich v ASIC. Unlike the majority judges, Kirby J did not think that a
particular sanction could be characterized by looking only to its bur-
den, since even the consequences of traditional civil remedies could
have catastrophic effects.Y2 0 Instead, the court must have engaged in a
complex evaluative process before it could characterize a sanction as
'punitive' or 'protective'.' 2 ' For Kirby J, the starting point was to
recognize the court's duty to accord primacy to the legislation, to
discover its meaning and application by examining its language,
structure and context, and to give effect to it.' 22 Thus, the legislature's
deliberate assignment of civil procedure to the proceedings was an
important indicator that should not be lightly displaced.'23 The pur-
pose of the disqualification order was not to be ascertained by looking
at the order in isolation, but it had to be understood in the context
of the serious social and economic problems it was intended to
address. 24 Its essential purpose was to uphold high standards of cor-
porate governance, the importance of which had been repeatedly
underscored by the far-reaching consequences of corporate misman-
agement and collapses both within and outside the national bounda-
ries. As far as possible, the civil penalty provisions should be
construed to further, not obstruct, this objective. 2 5 In addition, the
penal effects of the disqualification order appeared to have been over-
stated when regard was had to the fact that the capacity to manage a
118 See above text to nn. 48ff.
119 See Middleton, above n. at 516; Coffee, above n. at 1891-2; and Frieberg &
O'Malley, above n. 107 at 390-1.
120 See Rich v ASIC, above n. 113 at [79] and [100].
121 ibid. at [84].
122 ibid. at [61] and [901.
123 bid. at [96]-[98].
124 ibid. at [117]-[118].
125 ibid. at [1171 and [121].
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company was in substance a privilege created and conferred by stat-
ute subject to compliance with conditions.'26
Kirby 's incisive analysis amply demonstrates that the choice of
sanction is ultimately a policy decision.'2 7 The affixation of a civil or
criminal label to a sanction involves a delicate balancing exercise of
the community's interests against the constitutional rights of the in-
dividual. Such an exercise rightly falls within the purview of the legis-
lature. If additional constitutional safeguards are deemed necessary,
they should be the subject of express legislative provisions. While that
does not immunize any legislation against constitutional challenge, it
does behove the courts to approach with utmost caution any sugges-
tion to override the selection made by the legislature. Such an ap-
proach is arguably supported by the Australian Law Reform
Commission's recommendation, 28 and finds resonance in both the
United States'29 and in England.13 0 The common theme which
126 Ibid. at [102]-[106].
127 See Frieberg and O'Malley, above n. 107 at 387. See also S. K. Chan, 'The Criminal
Process-The Singapore Model' (1996) Singapore Law Review 433 at 438.
128 See Principled Regulation, above n. 103 at Recommendation 3-1: 'The Regulatory
Contraventions Statute should provide that, in the absence of any clear, express
statutory statement to the contrary, the procedures for the imposition of a civil
penalty be in accordance with the usual practice and procedure of the court in
civil cases or in accordance with the directions of the court or a judge.' The
Commission also took (at para. 3.67) the view that the courts should continue to
give greater protection on an ad hoc basis to ensure there is procedural fairness.
However, it is unclear whether the Commission had in mind a broad view of such
judicial discretion, such as that taken by the majority judges in Rich v ASIC (see
above text to nn. 113-17).
129 In Hudson v United States (1997) 118 S Ct 488, the Supreme Court affirmed the
traditional approach that whether a particular sanction is civil or criminal is first
and foremost a matter of statutory interpretation. In construing the legislation,
the court should first look to see if the legislature has either expressly or by
implication indicated its preference for a particular penalizing scheme. Secondly,
even in cases where the legislative intent is to create a civil remedy, the court
must still determine whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to transform it into a criminal penalty. In making the latter
determination, the court has to be guided by the 'useful guideposts' set out in
Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 83 S Ct 554 at 567-8: 'whether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned'. Significantly, the Supreme Court in Hudson stressed (at 493)
the need to consider these factors by looking at 'the statute 'on its face" and only
the "the strictest proof' will suffice to override the legislative intent and transform
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty'. Cf
L. Melenyzer, 'Double Jeopardy Protection From Civil Sanctions After Hudson v
United States' (1998-1999) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1007; and T.
Carhill, 'The Supreme Court's Decision in Hudson v United States: One Step Up
And Two Steps Back For Multiple Punishment Protection Under The Double
Jeopardy Clause' (1998) 33 Wake Forest Law Review 439.
130 See e.g. R (McCann and others) v Crown Court at Manchester, Clingham v
Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [20031 1 AC 787, where
the House of Lords was asked to apply more stringent evidential rules and the
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emerges from these authorities is that the characterization of a sanc-
tion must not be determined solely on the basis of its effect. Instead,
the mode of proceedings selected by the legislature should in general
be respected, and it will be an exceptional case where this is not so.
Such an exception can only be justified by evaluating an array of
factors including, for instance, the nature and effect of the sanction,
the desirability of condemning or stigmatizing the contravening be-
haviour, the nature and magnitude of the social problem it was de-
signed to remedy. In the context of directors' duties, a civil pecuniary
penalty that is fashioned to address conduct which falls short of
crime, which does not involve the finding of dishonesty or reckless-
ness, and which is capped at an amount no greater than a criminal
pecuniary penalty,' would appear to be distinctively civil in nature.
VII. Regulating Directors' Duties with Civil Penalties-
The Roadmap for Singapore
The foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate that the reg-
ulatory scheme in Singapore, as it now stands under s. 157, is unsat-
isfactory in view of its failure to distinguish between criminal and
non-criminal contraventions. The reform of this statutory provision
would involve two principal aspects. The first relates to the content of
directors' duties. The statement of directors' duties as it is currently
reflected in s. 157 will have to be replaced by a set of rules which more
accurately reflect the distinct components of the director's fiduciary
and common law duties. In this respect, further developments appear
to be imminent in view of the Company Legislation and Regulatory
Framework Committee's recommendation that the UK's restatement
of directors' duties13 2 be adopted (and adapted) in Singapore.133
The second aspect relates to the rationalization of sanctions, which
may be approached in at least two ways. The first would be to restrict
the application of criminal liability to instances where the contra-
ventions are accompanied by criminal intention, leaving the instances
criminal standard of proof to civil proceedings in respect of anti-social behaviour
under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 1. Their lordships unanimously held
that proceedings ought to be classified as civil under both domestic and European
Community laws. In the leading judgment, Lord Steyn took account of the
importance of communities' interests which the legislation was designed to
protect, the legislature's choice of proceedings as a 'controlling' (at [21]) factor, as
well as the need to look beyond the consequences of a sanction, and to consider
its purposes, in ascertaining its character. However, Lord Steyn also held that the
seriousness of the matters involved would justify a heightened civil standard of
proof, which should, for pragmatic reasons, be understood as the criminal
standard.
131 Cf the ALRC's argument that civil penalties may, on occasion, exceed criminal
penalties by virtue of the divergent purposes served by the two types of sanctions:
see Principled Regulation, above n. 103, Recommendation 26-3.
132 The latest draft of this restatement can be found in the UK Government's White
Paper on Company Law Reform (March 2005), Ch. 7 (Draft Clauses), part B.
133 CLRFC Report, above n. 2, Recommendation 3.6.
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of (non-criminal) simple defaults to be redressed by the traditional
civil remedies (such as damages and account of profits) that avail at
common law. This would not, however, be a completely satisfactory
solution if the perception that the existing civil remedies are inade-
quate deterrents of management misconduct proves to be true. Al-
though the reality of this concern ought ultimately to be established
by empirical evidence, such concern is unlikely to be insubstantial
having regard to the well-known obstacles that stand in the way of
shareholders' enforcement, such as lack of accessibility to information
and inadequate financial resources.1 34 It is therefore submitted that
the attempt to decriminalize s. 157 ought to be accompanied by the
introduction of civil penalties which would serve principally as an
additional deterrence against management dereliction. In this regard,
some practical pointers may be distilled from the discussion in the
preceding sections:
1. The usefulness of the civil penalty is derived principally from its
civil character. This particular characteristic of the sanction
should be reflected in three aspects: first, it should apply only to
non-criminal conduct; secondly, its burden (namely its effects)
should generally be less onerous than its criminal counterpart;
and finally, the usual incidence of civil procedural and evidential
rules should generally apply.
2. The theory of strategic enforcement highlights the role of the
civil penalty in enhancing the responsiveness of the enforce-
ment regime. It does not, however, displace the principle of
proportionality. The civil penalty should not, therefore, be in-
troduced or used merely for the purpose of circumventing the
more onerous procedural and evidential requirements of the
criminal process.
3. The state of mind in which a contravention was committed is
the chief criterion for distinguishing between civil and criminal
offences. In this connection, the exclusion of simple negligence
as a qualifying criminal intention under the Australian scheme
appears to be correct as a matter of principle. 135
4. Under the Australian scheme, the commencement of civil pen-
alty proceedings does not bar future criminal proceedings in
respect of the substantially same course of conduct.136 This is
supportable provided that the risk of double jeopardy is kept at
bay by ensuring that the punitive effects that inhere in the civil
penalty order are adequately accounted for in the sentencing
deliberations of the criminal proceedings.
134 See the judicial recognition of such deficiency in Lir Weng Kee v PP, above n. 80.
135 Above n. 72.
136 Above n. 45.
